**QUESTION FOR THE LAS BOARD – JANUARY 31st 2017**

1. **Board Papers**

**Will the Board please ensure that Board papers are placed on the LAS website 7 days before each meeting?**

**Note: no papers have appeared on the LAS website for this meeting.**

1. **Infection Control**

**Will the Board review its infection control policies to ensure that all staff are vaccinated against influenza, and that front line staff don’t suffer penalties for taking sick leave?**

**Note: the Forum regularly receives reports of staff with obvious symptoms of colds/’flu’ participating in patient care.**

1. **Safeguarding Training**

**Will the Board ensure that they exercise full governance over the Safeguarding training of Bank staff in view of the inadequate levels of training through CSR for this group of staff?**

1. **CAD Outage Inquiry**
2. **Will the Board provide the names of the internal and external experts who are investigating the outage, and invite the Forum to observe the investigation?**
3. **Will the Board please ensure that the following questions are answered by the CAD Outage Inquiry? They have been submitted twice the Acting Chief Executive, but no response or acknowledgement has been received.**

**Dear Andrew, thanks so much for attending the Forum meeting, updating our members and answering their questions. Fionna invited me to observe the process of investigation and I would be very interested in doing that.**

**Our full list of questions for the Inquiry is as follows:**

**(1) How many major outages have there been each year since the installation of the £26 million Command Point system that caused a total breakdown?**

**(2) How many outages have there been on Command Point that have been serious but not complete breakdowns each year over the same period?**

**(3) Was there a process of completely independent scrutiny of  Command Point resilience when it was in the design stage and when it became fully operational?**

**4) Who is carrying out the investigation into the January 1st outage and who are the independent members of the investigation team?**

**5) How has the SI has been described for the investigation and what will the process and timescale be?**

**6) What learning has taken place since January 1st to prevent further outages?**

**7) How confident are you that further outages will not occur?**

**8) What was the impact on LAS responses to Cat A and Cat C calls in terms of response times to calls January 1st?**

**9) We are aware that one serious outcome has been identified. Do you have details of any other consequences of the outage for patients?**

**10) Does it look at if the problem was with the database rather than the equipment?**

**11) Is anything more known from analysis provided by Northup Grumman? Did the NG instituted diagnostic process reveal anything of relevance?**

**12) At a Board meeting a couple of years ago that there was a discussion about a Command Point resilience project and a request for changes to the software – was this part of a developing process or a one off?**

**13) Our previous questions and responses are shown below. Do you have anything further to add to these responses?**

**A) Does Command Point have sufficient capacity to deal with the annual increases in demand? I think this is running at about 10% per year. Yes, our increase in demand is not an issue for Command Point. We believe the underlying problem may be related to the capacity of the databases, rather than the system itself, but this is part of the investigation and it would be imprudent to comment further until we have more information.**

**B) Is there an end point in relation to software design and capacity of the system, if demand continued to grow by 10% each year? Not that I am aware of.**

**C) If the capacity of Command Point is a problem can the capacity of the system be increased? As above**

**D) Does the system or software need to by upgraded to prevent further outages and would there be any problem in enacting such upgrades? We are working closely with Northup Grumman (who have already started an investigation in the US, by opening up their diagnostic lab) to look into this. Until the investigation is complete it would not be appropriate to speculate.**

**E) Are there any plans for the use of programmed outages to overhaul the Command Point system? We do undertake regular programmed outages of CP. These are referred to as OP 66 – which is when the EOCs go to paper, and we revert to dispatching by radio. These are not an overhaul of Command Point, but the opportunity to reset the databases. We have a schedule to undertake these planned take downs of the system. As you will remember from 2011, it is vital that the Control Rooms and our frontline staff remain well versed and practiced in the paper and radio based contingency position.**

**F) Will you let me know the outcome of your enquiry into the January 1st outage? Yes, as in my email above I am happy to commit to this. It would be very helpful to have you involved in the investigation.**